Guide

How to use BLKH01E.

What each part of the app is for, where every setting lives, and which configuration matches the protection you actually need. Written for someone who has just installed it.

The home screen, part by part

Everything starts here. The row of squares at the top are the actions, the bar below searches inside the vault, and the cards are your drawers, each showing how many items it holds.

BLKH01E home screen with action buttons, search bar and vault drawers — The home screen. Actions on top, search below, then your drawers and the Conversations, Encryption and Wallets rows.

The X, first on the left. Locks the vault right now. Use it whenever you put the phone down. Leaving the app also locks it, always.
Speech bubble. Conversations. Encrypted messages with people you added by QR.
Padlock. Encryption. Encrypt a text or a file to send through WhatsApp, email or any channel you already use.
Globe. Private browser. Browsing with no history kept and trackers blocked.
Shield. Security. The panel for your private universe: network, device, shielding, protections and recovery in one place.
Gear. Settings. Every configuration in this guide is behind this button.
The drawers and adding items. Tap a drawer (Photos & Videos, Audio, Documents, Passwords, Links, Contacts) to open what is inside it and add new items.
Search the vault. Finds by name and, once content search is on, by what is written inside your photos and documents.

First steps

Four things to do on day one. Ten minutes now, and the rest of the app makes sense afterwards.

BLKH01E lock screen with numeric code entry — The lock screen. This code is what rebuilds your key, so nobody can reset it for you.

Create your code

Your code is what derives the key that opens everything. It is not stored on any server, so there is no reset link and no support call that recovers it. Six digits or more is enough for daily use, because the phone's security chip limits how fast anyone can try again.

In the appSettingsCode & Face IDChange code

Write the recovery phrase on paper

Twelve words. They are the only way back if you forget the code. Write them by hand and keep the paper away from the phone. Do not photograph them, do not put them in the cloud, do not save them in another app on the same device. A photo of the phrase in your camera roll undoes the whole point.

In the appSettingsRecovery phrase

Set the vault to lock by itself

Choose how long the vault waits with no touch before locking and clearing the key from memory. One minute is a good default. There is also a flip-to-lock option: turn the phone face down and it locks instantly, which is a discreet way to close everything when someone walks up to you.

In the appSettingsLock & protection

Add something, then export a backup

Put in a first photo or document, then export an encrypted backup file and keep it somewhere other than the phone. If the phone is lost and no backup exists, the content is gone. That is the design working, not a failure.

In the appSettingsBackup & export

What you can actually do with it

Each feature below has a situation it was built for. Everything runs on the phone, inside the same encrypted environment.

Keeping things

Photos, videos and audio

The photos of documents you send to an accountant, or a recording of a meeting.

They live encrypted in the vault, with thumbnails generated on the phone. Audio plays straight from memory, so it never becomes a loose file someone can find.

Camera straight to the vault

Photographing your passport or a contract without it landing in your camera roll.

Open the camera from inside the app and the photo is born encrypted. It never touches the iPhone gallery, so it never syncs anywhere.

Documents

A lease, a medical result, a contract with a client.

Import PDFs and text files and read them inside the app, without exporting them to open somewhere else.

Passwords and AutoFill

Replacing the notes app or the piece of paper where the passwords are.

Store the site, the username and the password, generate strong ones, and fill them straight into apps and websites when iOS asks.

Contacts, links and wallets

A source's phone number, or the seed phrase of a crypto wallet.

Contact cards, addresses that open in the private browser, and wallet seeds and keys kept encrypted with a receive QR.

Timed self-destruct

A document you only need for this week.

Set a deadline on an item and it disappears on its own when the time is up, without you having to remember.

Finding things again

Content search

You know you photographed the receipt, but not what you named the file.

The app reads the text inside photos, PDFs and documents and transcribes audio, all on the phone. Then searching for a word inside the document finds it. Turn it on once and let it index.

In the appSettingsContent search

Semantic search

You search for rent receipt and the file is called IMG_4021.

Finds by meaning, not only by exact words, using the on-device model. Nothing about your search leaves the phone.

AI summary

A forty page contract you need the gist of.

The on-device model summarizes it. The summary is shown and discarded, never saved and never sent anywhere. Turn off the internet and it still works, which is the easiest way to prove it to yourself.

Password health

Finding out which of your passwords is weak, repeated or already in a public leak.

Weak and repeated ones are found on the phone. The leak check is optional and sends only five characters of a code derived from the password, never the password itself.

Talking to someone

Adding a contact by QR

You and the other person are in the same room, once.

Each of you scans the other's QR code. That single in-person moment is what makes it impossible for someone in the middle to pose as either of you later.

Encrypted conversations

Talking to a source, a client or a family member without a company in between.

Messages are encrypted end to end, with no account and no server holding the conversation. Each message uses a new key, so a leak of one does not open the previous ones.

Three ways to deliver

No signal, normal internet, or a channel you pick yourself.

Nearby sends straight to a phone next to you with no internet. Live goes over the internet through a relay that only sees encrypted traffic. Or copy the encrypted block and send it through WhatsApp, email, anything.

Standalone encryption

Sending a file to someone who does not have the app.

Encrypt a text, image, audio file or document with a password you agree on by another route, then send it however you like. Only that password opens it.

BLKH01E encryption tool, encrypting a message or file with a password — Encryption. Turn a message or a file into a block that only the right person opens, then send it through any channel.

BLKH01E private browser, an ephemeral browsing session — The private browser. The session leaves no history behind and blocks trackers while you read.

Three levels of protection

This is the part that matters most. Pick the level that matches what you are actually afraid of, and set exactly what it lists. Each level adds protection and takes away some convenience.

BLKH01E settings screen with code, recovery phrase, decoy vault and protections — The Settings screen. Every path in this guide starts from here, through the gear on the home screen.

LEVEL 1

Everyday

For anyone who does not want a lost or stolen phone to turn into an exposure. Most people are here.

Set this

A code of six digits or moreIn the appSettingsCode & Face IDChange code
Face ID on, so locking often is not annoyingIn the appSettingsCode & Face ID
Lock by inactivity after five minutesIn the appSettingsLock & protection
Recovery phrase written on paper, kept away from the phoneIn the appSettingsRecovery phrase
Encrypted backup to your own iCloud DriveIn the appSettingsBackup & export

Covers

A lost or stolen phone, someone curious with your device in hand, and leaks from other companies' servers, since your content was never on one.

Does not cover

Someone forcing you to open the vault. At this level, whoever compels you gets the real one.

LEVEL 2

Hardened

For journalists, lawyers, doctors, accountants and executives. Anyone holding material that belongs to someone else.

Add to level 1

A keyword on top of the numeric code, which makes guessing far harderIn the appSettingsCode & Face IDChange code
Lock by inactivity after one minute, and flip to lock turned onIn the appSettingsLock & protection
Every contact added face to face by QR and confirmed by security numberIn the appHomeConversationscontacts
Timed self-destruct on the most sensitive itemsIn the appItemself-destruct
An exported .blkh01e file protected by a five or six word phrase, kept offlineIn the appSettingsBackup & export

Covers

Everything in level 1, plus forensic analysis of a seized phone, interception of messages in transit, and someone trying to pose as one of your contacts.

Costs you

Typing your code more often, and a backup phrase you have to store properly instead of trusting to memory.

LEVEL 3

Under duress

For anyone who may be forced to open the vault: a border crossing, a seizure, a direct threat.

Add to level 2

A decoy vault created and genuinely filled in, following the steps belowIn the appSettingsDecoy vault
Face ID off, because a face can be pointed at a phone and a code cannot be taken out of your headIn the appSettingsCode & Face ID
Lock by inactivity at one minute, flip to lock onIn the appSettingsLock & protection
Destroy after repeated wrong codes, if losing the content is better than surrendering itIn the appSettingsLock & protection
No iCloud backup, only an exported file kept elsewhereIn the appSettingsBackup & export

Covers

Everything above, plus the moment someone demands that you unlock. You hand over the decoy code, it opens a plausible vault, and the app's interface shows nothing that says a second one exists.

Honest limit

A forensic examiner holding your real code may still infer, from the number of stored files, that a second vault exists. It protects what is in there, not the fact that it exists. The app says exactly this on its own screen.

Setting up the decoy vault properly

Almost everyone gets this one wrong, and a decoy done wrong is worse than none. The app walks you through it, and the order matters.

Do it from the vault you want to protect

Open your real vault first and create the decoy from inside it. The code you confirm has to be the one of the vault that is open now.

Choose a different second code

This is the code you will hand over under pressure. It has to be plausible on its own, so do not make it obviously throwaway like 1111.

Lock, then open with the false code

The decoy is a separate vault. You only reach it by locking and unlocking with the second code.

Fill it with believable content and keep using it

Ordinary photos, a few notes, some real but disposable passwords. A vault that opens onto nothing announces that it is the false one. Go back into it now and then so it looks lived in.

The right password in each place

This is the difference between a vault that holds and one that does not. Your code on the phone and the password on an exported file are not defending against the same attack, and they should not be equally long.

On the phone

The key is tied to a factor inside the iPhone's security chip that cannot be copied out. Copying the storage and attacking it on a powerful computer does not work, because every attempt needs the chip itself. That holds guessing to around one attempt per second, so even a six digit code takes an unreasonable amount of time.

On an exported file

A .blkh01e file has no chip behind it. Each guess is made deliberately slow and expensive, but from there only the strength of your password decides. Eight digits fall in hours to dedicated hardware. Five or six random words hold up even against a state-level attacker.

The rule: keep the daily code short enough that you actually lock the vault, and make the export phrase the strongest thing you can genuinely remember. Five random words beat a short mix of symbols, and a dictionary word with a number at the end is not a phrase.

Mistakes that weaken a strong vault

An empty decoy vault. A vault that opens onto nothing announces that it is the false one. Fill it with ordinary content and open it now and then.
The recovery phrase on the phone. A photo of the twelve words in your camera roll, or a note synced to the cloud, cancels out everything else. Paper, somewhere else.
Reusing the vault code. If the same code protects an account somewhere else, a leak over there becomes a good guess over here.
Counting on Face ID under pressure. Face ID is there so that locking often is not annoying. It is not a defense when someone can hold the phone up to your face. Turn it off at level 3.
Confirming a contact by message. A security number confirmed over the same channel proves nothing, because whoever is in the middle can confirm it too. Do it in person.
Only the cloud backup. An encrypted backup in your iCloud is good. An exported file kept somewhere else is what survives losing the account itself.
Leaving the lock set to never. With no inactivity lock, whoever picks up the unlocked phone sees everything. One minute costs you almost nothing.

Where the model ends

No encryption protects data that is exposed on a compromised device while it is being used. With the vault open in your hand, whatever you have decrypted is reachable. Screenshots, malware and operating system flaws are outside the model, and the app says so on its own screens. Everything in this guide raises the cost of an attack. None of it makes any system unbreakable.

Read the security architecture